Improving Information Security
with Social Psychology

  

By Daniel I. Didier 
8/07/2008


Introduction

People make bad decisions.  Insurance companies exist to protect people against unforeseen problems of which many are caused by poor decision-making.  The results of these unfortunate decisions can be seen in the form of car accidents, fires, floods, and personal injuries.  Information systems are not immune to poor decision-making and the repercussions of poor judgment, even on behalf of just a single person, can have an astoundingly negative affect on the information security of these systems.

Many organizations have realized the value associated with the creation, implementation and ongoing maintenance of a well-defined information security policy and awareness program.  However, organizations sometimes fail to realize how influential human nature and social psychology can be to either the success or failure of these policies.  This paper briefly discusses why people make bad security trade-offs and poor risk calculations and summarizes ways that an organization can use social psychology to improve the effectiveness of their information security policies. 

 

Security Trade-offs and Risk Perception

The implementation of information security measures always involves a trade-off.  This may be in the form of money, time, convenience, capabilities, or liberties.  A common ground must be found that is an acceptable trade-off between inconvenience and security.  There is no such thing as absolute security (unless you plan to stop doing business), and any improvement in security will always involve a trade-off. [1]

Security can not be substantiated by only looking at its effectiveness.  An effective security solution may have unacceptable trade-offs. [2]   For example, limiting Internet access to only a single isolated computer may be very effective for limiting threats, but it also carries extreme trade-offs that are not sustainable if a business wishes to remain solvent. 

To make decisions that result in acceptable trade-offs, we must first understand and properly interpret risk.  Humans, the most successful species on the planet, are very good at making life enabling decisions that have lead to world-wide proliferation.  However, our innate ability to survive as a species does not benefit us when interpreting and responding to digital threats.    

As Bruce Schneier points out, there are several aspects of a security trade-off that can go wrong:

  1. The severity of the risk.
  2. The probability of the risk.
  3. The magnitude of the costs.
  4. How effective the countermeasure is at mitigating risk.
  5. How well disparate risks and costs can be compared. [3]

If any one of these five aspects is over or under exaggerated, the more a perceived trade-off won’t match the actual trade-off.  Ignorance can be a major factor in this.  However, much of the time decisions are made that result in irrational trade-offs for no apparent reason.  For example, many of us are more afraid to fly than to drive, even though driving is statistically safer.  This illogical decision can be attributed to our innate survival instincts.  Many irrational trade-offs, especially as it relates to information security, can be explained by psychology. [4]   For this reason, through the understanding and application of psychology, the effectiveness of information security policies can be improved.

 

Improving Information Security Policies with Social Psychology

Information Security experts agree that employees are a much greater risk to information security than outsiders.  In addition, security depends more on people than technology. [5]

For this reason, many organizations have invested in the development of a comprehensive information security policy and awareness program.  However, many fail to recognize the criticality that social psychology has on the success or failure of the policy.

To improve security, it is necessary to change beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of both the individual and the group.  Social psychology allows us to understand how to best work with human bias and dispositions to achieve the ultimate goal of improving security.  Through understanding others’ behavior, and avoiding errors of attribution, security staff can more effectively communicate the value of security policies. [6]

Errors of Attribution

Interpretation of employee behavior is critical to understand when trying to change corporate culture.  Failure to properly attribute people’s feelings can cause conflict between the security personnel and other employees. 

People’s behavior can be classified in two separate dimensions:  internal or external and stable or unstable.  A simple four-way classification, provided by Dr. Kabay, helps define these dimensions by explaining why an employee has failed to log off her session for the fourth time this week:

  • Internal, stable: “That’s just the way she is – she never pays attention to these rules.”
  • Internal, unstable: “She’s been under strain lately because her child is sick – that’s why she’s forgotten.”
  • External, stable: “The system doesn’t respond properly to the logoff command.”
  • External, unstable: “This week, the system has not been responding properly to the logoff command.” [7]

There are many types of attribution errors, but for the purpose of this essay, the most important error will be discussed; the fundamental attribution error.  People assume, often wrongfully, that a person’s actions are stable, internal features.  For example, a naïve belief is that an actor’s personality on the big screen is the same off the set.  An actor that portrays a criminal may be treated negatively by viewers that fail to realize that the actor was doing as he should; acting.  This obvious example of an attribution error can cause people (viewers) to react in ways that are not fitting of reality. [8]

These same types of attribution errors must be avoided by security personnel.  Jumping to conclusions and accusing an employee of failing to comply with security policy without first being objective can create alienation and resentment in the workforce.  If an employee is treated harshly or in an unfriendly manner, it is likely that the employee will associate security with unpleasant people, thereby reducing the employee’s willingness to comply with policy.  In addition, the employee will likely communicate his or her negative experiences to other employees creating further tension in the workforce. [9]

Security personal must avoid alienation of employees by understanding the fundamental attribution errors that are most often made.  By adopting a less judgmental, more objective mentality to communicating and enforcing security policy, security personnel will be more likely to receive a positive response from employees.

Specific types of attribution errors that should be avoided, as discussed by Dr. Kabay, include:

  • Actor-Observer Effect
  • Self-Serving Bias
  • Salience and Prejudice
  • Intercultural Differences
  • Framing Reality

While these topics are not discussed in this essay, further research should be done to more completely understand specific attribution errors and avoidance techniques.

 

Conclusion

Social psychology and errors of attribution have been briefly discussed in this paper and should serve as a launching point for individuals and organizations to perform further research.  The effectiveness of a security program, especially an information security awareness campaign can be greatly enhanced by understanding corporate culture and expectations. 

Awareness and avoidance of the fundamental attribution errors across the security staff will help to improve the positive impact of information security policies and programs and reduce the likelihood of resentment and alienation in the workforce.  Social psychology, if used properly, can be an incredibly powerful enabler for improving information security.

Works Cited

Kabay, M.E., “Using Social Psychology to Implement Security Policies.” In Wiley, Computer Security Handbook, 4th edition. New York, NY. 2002

Schneier, Bruce. "The Psychology of Security." Schneier.com. http://www.schneier.com/essay-155.html (accessed July 29, 2008).



[1] Schneier, Bruce. "The Psychology of Security." Schneier.com. http://www.schneier.com/essay-155.html (accessed July 29, 2008).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kabay, M.E., “Using Social Psychology to Implement Security Policies.” In Wiley, Computer Security Handbook, 4th edition. New York, NY. 2002

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

 

 


 
 

Daniel I. Didier - Information Assurance / Information Security Consultant

Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Professional
Cisco Certified Security Professional CCSP
Cisco Technology Solution Specialist TSS
Cisco Advanced Security Field Specialist ASFE
Cisco Certified Network Administrator CCNA



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